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V.
LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION AS CONTROLLED BY THE
RESTRICTIONS.
IN addition to the prohibition of local or special laws
in regard to certain specified matters, many constitutions
provide- that no such law shall be passed in any other case
where a general law can be made applicable.
2 Under such
a clause the question has arisen as to whether the legisla-
ture is the sole judge of the possible applicability of a gen-
eral law, or whether the final decision rests with the courts.
In Missouri the constitution of 1875' set the matter to rest
by declaring it a judicial question, but elsewhere the point
is raised from time to;time.
The earliest decision oft this point was made ihi Indiana
in 1854 in Thomas v. Clay County Commissioners," where
the Court pertinently observed that if it be held that in
passing a special law the legislature had decided that a
general law could not be made applicable, without the pos-
sibility of an appeal from this decision, the provision re-
quiring general legislation whenever applicable "has no
vitality; nor is there any reason why it should have a place
I Commenced in the July number.
2 Ala., Ark., Cal., Col., Fla. (Const, of 1868, not in new Const.), Ill.,
Ind., Io., Kan., Miss., Mo., Mont-, Neb., Nev., N. Dak., S. Dak., Tex.,.
W. Va., Wy. The Act of Congress of July 3
o , 1886, as to legislation in
the territories also contains this provision.
3 Art. IV, 53, cl. 32. "Whether a general law could have been
made applicable in any case is hereby declared a judicial question, and
as such" shall be judically determined without regard to any legislative
assertion on that subject." The decision 6f the Supreme Court had been
the other way. See infra.
5 Ind., 4. In Stocking v. State, 9 id., 326, decided a year later, the
court simply say: "If we doubted the constitutionality of the act under
the clause in question, we should be bound to throw the benefit of the
doubt in favor of the constitutionality of the law."
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in the constitution. It would, impose no restriction upon
the action of the legislature nor cofifer any power which
-that body would not possess in the absence of such a pro-.
vision., If that section permits the legislature to enact a
special or local law ad libitum, in any case not enumerated,
the principle involved would deprive this court of all au-
thority to call in question the correctness of a legislative
construction of its own powers under the constitution. We
are not prepared to sanction this doctrine. The maxim
that 'Parliament is omnipotent ' has no place in American
jurisprudence. Whether the legislature have, in the case
at bar, acted within the scope of their authority.is, in our
opinion, a proper subject of judicial inquiry."
This doctrine, though subsequently abandoned in In-
- diana,1 has been followed in Iowa,' but the latest decision
in that State points out that the exercise of legislative dis-
cretion, in this as in all other matters, is not to be disturbed
except in a clear case.' So modified, the doctrine is now
held also in Nevada4 and Colorado. In the latter State the
matter was approached from the other side, and it was first
announced, in reliance on certain authorities given below,
that "whether a general 'law can be made applicable or
C" whether a special law is authorized for a purpose not fall-
ing within the enumeration of prohibited cases, is peculiarly
a legislative question; and also that "it is to be presumed,
upon the passage of a special statute that in the judgment
of the law makers after full and fair investigation, a gen-
eral law would not affect the purpose designed to be accom-
plished." ' This, however, is not now regarded as exclud-
-ing the paramount right of the courts to review acts of the
legislature, and in a later caseS the Court said: "While, the
I Gentile v. State, 29 Ind., 409, and other cases cited infra.
2 Expfarte Pritz, 9 Io., 30 (A. D. 1859); McGregor v. Baylies, i
id., 43.
3 Richmau v. Board of Supervisors, 77 1o., 513.
4 Clark v. Irwin,-5 Nev. 111, 124; Hess v. Pegg, 7 id., 23; in re
Sticknoth's Est., id., 223; Evans v. Job, 8 id., 322.
5 Carpenter vz. People, 8 Col., II6, 122, 123; followed in Darrow v.
People, id., 426.
6 Coulter v. Routt Co., 9 Col., 258.
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presumption of good faith and sound judgment attach to
the acts of legislativ6 assemblies, it is well known that they
are liable to commit grave mistakes. To hold that the
enactment of a provision involving the palpable abuse of
discretion, or that the assumption of discretionary power in
a case clearly inapplicable to the rule, cannot 'be judicially
reviewed and annulled, would, in our judgment, subject
the court to well-merited criticism for inefficiency in the
performance of their judicial functions." Accordingly it
was held that a general law not only could be, but had
been passed, covering the purpose of the act under consid-
eration,, and that the latter was void.
In New Jersey, owing to the peculiar language of the
constitution, it is held that even in the enumerated cases
special legislation is not absolutely prohibited, but only
where a general law could be made applicable.' This in-
volves, of course, an exercise of the judgment of the legisla-
ture in all dases, but that such judgment is exercised subject
to the ultimate right of the court to decide upon the appli-
cability of general laws in all cases was distinctly laid down
in Pell v. Newark,' a case afterward confirmed in the Court
of Appeals. The act under consideration was one regulating
the internal affairs of municipalities (one of the ' I entimerated
cases "), and the Supreme Court said: "Assuming that this
law is vicious, if the same end could be attained by general
legislation, it becomes necessary to determine what tribu-
nal shall settle that question. ..... .. Does the Jonsti-
tution make the legislature the final arbiter in this matter?
Whether a given enactment is constitutignal, involves inter-
pretation and construction-the -exercise of purely judicial
functions. Policy is as clearly a question for the legisla-
.Van Riper v. Parsons, 4o N. J. Law, I; Pell v. Newark, id., 7i;
affirmed, id., 550. The language of the constitution is, "the legislature
shall not pass private, local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases ........ The legislature shall pass general laws
providing for the cases enumerated in this paragraph, and for all other
cases which, in its judgment, may be provided for by general laws."
Art. IV, 7, par. ii, Amendments of 1875.
2 4o N. J. L., 71 ; affirmed, id., 550.
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ture. The duty of the several branches of our State gov-
ernment. is well defined. No legislative power is conferred
.upon the judiciary ; no judicial power-upon the legislature.
It would require very clear language to justify the assertion
that in these amendments the people intended to vest judi-
,cial power in the law maker. Such a rule would subvert
the theory upon which our system is framed, and disturb
the checks and balances by which it is guarded. Whether
the legislature transcended its power, and passed an act in
conflict with the constitution, is essentially a question of
law, and must necessarily be passed upon by the courts.
"These provisions being incorporated under the fun-
damental law were desigund to establish a fixed and perma-
nent rule, but it is manifest that nothing could be-more
* flexible, if it rests solely in the judgment and discretion of
the body upon which it is intended to operate.
That the legislature would act in good faith must be pre-
sumed; but that the people should have deliber-
ately framed, and imbedded in their organic law an amend-
ment to prohibit special legislation where general laws
might be passed, and at the same time should have
intended to put legislative action beyond review, where
there was a clear infraction of the prohibition, is a propo-
sition to which it seems impossible to assent."
In California the question has not yet been expressly
decided, but it has been judicially announced that as the
constitution states its provisions to be mandatory and pro-
hibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise, the question, should it arise, would probably
be for the court to decide.'
In opposition to these authorities, however, the courts
.of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,. Kansas, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, and now Indiana -also, maintain that the legis-
lature must decide whether a general law can be made
applicable, and such was the rftle in Missouri before the
Constitution of 1875.
The first decision to this effect was rendered in 1862,
I Earle v. Board of Education, 55 Cal., 489.
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in the Kansas case of State v. Hitchcock,' holding that the
test was not the possibility of framing a general law to
cover the case, but whether such law, if enacted, would
work as satisfactorily as a special act, and that this was for
the legislature to decide.
The Court said: "We understand this section of the
Constitution as leaving a discretibn to the legislature, for it
would be difficult to imagine a legislative purpose which
could not be accomplished under a general law.
That provision . . . recognizes the necessity of some
special legislation, and seeks only to limit, not to prohibit
it." This case has since been repeatedly followed in Kan-
sas 2 and the fact that a special law may affect to some
extent throughout the State the uniform operation of othef
laws, is held not to weigh against it.3
In Indiana, in i868 (none of the judges who had sat
upon the supreme bench fourteen years before being in
office), Tfomas v. Clay County Commissioners,' was over-
ruled. The Court said that this general restriction upon
special legislation is "binding upon the conscience of every
member of the [legislative] body, the application of which
must be judged of and determined as cases are presented
under the oath (which all the members ate required to take
before entering upon their duties) to support the Constitu-
tion of the State, and it cannot be presumed that the mem-
bers of that body would wilfully disregard the restriction
or their obligations to support it, in the enactment of the
laws. It is, therefore, an error to say that the restriction
is of no validity unless the correctness of the legislative
judgment is subject to revision by the courts. . . It
I i Kan., 178.
2 Beach v. Leahy, ii Kan., 23; Francis v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., i9
id., 303; Commrs. v. Shoemaker, 27 id., 77; Knowles v. Board, 33 id., 692;
Wichita v. Burleigh, 36 id., 34; Washburn v. Commrs., 37 i., 217; The
State v. Sanders, 42 id., 228. In State v. Liewelling (Kan., 1893), 33 Pac.
Rep., 428, it was held that no general law could have been made appli-
cable to the purpose (establishing the boundaries of a new county), and
the question of legislative discretion was not passed upon.
Washburn v. Conmrs., 37 Kan., 217.
5 Ind., 4, sultra.
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[the restriction] only then involves the question of fact
whether - the act is such. that a general law could not be
made applicable. It is a question which, as said before,
the legislature must necessarily determine; and it may be
.pertinently asked, what possible benefit could arise from
the power of the courts to call in questioi the benefit of
such legislative decisions? We are far from claiming that
the 'legislature is omnipotent, but, on the other hand, we
are not sure that the superior wisdom of the court would,
in such cases, enable them to judge more accurately than
the legislature. The question is one which in its very
nature, particularly 'addresses itself to the legislative judg-
ment, and if a local law be enacted, the reasons upon which
the legislature adjudged that a general law could not be
.nfade applicable, however satisfactory they may appear to
the members of that body, may not appear on the face of
the law, and the courts are left in ignorance of them, and
if, permitted to review the legislative decisions, must act
upon such reasons and facts as may suggest themselves to
the mind; and thus the legislature and courts would be
liable to be brought into 'frequent conflict, to no beneficial
purpose." /
The same view was taken in Alabama, where the
Sui~reme Court' said that "to hold that the question
whether the object of a proposed local or special statute
can be provided for by a general law is, at all times, one of
judicial inquiry, would lead to most deplorable doubt and
uncertainty alike in the enactment and administration of
the law. There is scarcely a conceivable subject of local
or special grievance, for the redress of which an ingenious
advocate or disputant could not find or frame a general
'Gentile v. State, 29 Ind., 409. This case has since been followed in
State v. Boone, 50 id., 225; Longworth v. Com. Council, 32 id., 322;
Clem v. State, 33 id., 48; State v. Tucker, 46 id., 355; Kelly v. State, 92
id., 326; Johnson v. Wells C6. Commrs., 107 id., 15; Evansville v. State,
x8 id., 426; State v. Kolsem, 130id., 434. In this last case it was argued
by McBRIDE, J., in a long dissenting opinion, that what was said in Gen-
tile v. State, was only obiter, the decision being that the law was a gen-
eral one, and not special.
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-,uactment." ' The decisions 2"in the five other States above
mentioned, as also in Oklahoma, are based upon the
a .ithority of the Kansas and Indiana cases.
Of these two mutually irreconcilable views, that which
restricts the legislative discretion is certainly the more'
logical. The question of the applicability of a general law
must, of course, be first answered by the legislature, and
to that extent its judgment is necessarily exercised ; but
where a constitution has forbidden the enactment of special
or local laws under certain circumstances, it can hardly
have been intended that the legislature should be the final
judge as to the existence of the circumstances which are to
rule its action, or in other words, as to whether or not it is
forbidden to do a particular thing. Apart from the ques-
tion of logic, the weight of authority is quite evenly
divided.'
Where a general law has been enacted, the question
as to its applicability can no longer be raised, so that the
legislature has no further discretion in the matter. Hence,
one of the United States Circuit Courts has held that even
in Kansas a special law cannot be enacted for a case which
is within the operation of an existing general law.4 In
Georgia, too, where the constitution forbids special laws,
"in any case for which provision has been made by an
existing general law, this has been held to deprive the
legislature of all choice in such cases.'
t Clarke v. Jack, 6o Ala., 271.
2 Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark., 69; Little Rock v. Parrish, 36 id., 166, 172;
State v. Sumter Co. Commrs., ig Fla., 518; State.v. Boone Co. Ct., 5o
Mo., 37; State v. Madrid Co. Ct., 51 id., 82; Hall v. Bray, id., 288; Bd.
of Commrs. v. Shields, 62 id., 247; Edmonds v. Herbrandson iN. Dak.),
50 N. W. Rep., 970; Johnson v. Mocabee (Okla.), 32 Pac. Rep., 336.
3 Hence, while Judge Dillon's statement (2 Mun. Corp., 48), that
"the better view, and the one supported by the decided weight of author-
ity, is that it is for the legislature to determine whether its 'purpose can
or cannot be expediently effected by a general law," may have been
correct when written, it must now be thought to call for some modifi-
cation.
Travelers' Ins. Co.v. Oswego, 55 Fed. Rep., 361.
Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga., 807; Camp v. Tompkins, id., 812; Crabb v.
State (Ga., 1892), i5 S. R. Rep., 455.
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As to the matters in regard to which a constitution
expressly'forbids local or special legislation, it seems incon-
-testable that the legislature has no choice or discretion
whateVer,1 unless directly granted by the constitution itself.
An instance of such direct grant of permission is found in
the provision of the New York constitution, and of that
formerly in use in Illinois, in regard to corporations. The
language (identical in both) is, -"corp6rations may be
formed under general laws, but shall not be created by
special acts, except . . in cases where, in the judg-
ment of the legislature, the object of the corporation
cannot be attained under general laws." 2 In New York it
has consistently been held that this means the exclusive
judgment 6f the legislature, which judgment the- court has
.no authority to control. The same position was taken in
Illinois, but only on the ground of long usage, which could
not be changed without very serious consequences, the
Court saying: "It is now too late to make the objection,
since by the act of the General Assembly under this clause
special acts have been so long the, order of the day
and important and v~luable rights claimed under them.
-The clause has been wholly disregarded, and it would now
produce far-spread ruin to declare such acts unconstitutional
and void. It is now safer and more just to all parties to
declare that itl must be understood that in the opinion of
the General Assembly, at the time of passing the special
act, its object could not be attained under the general law,
- and this without any recital by way of preamble." 4
While the express reference in these two constitutions
to "the judgment of the legislature," undoubtedly fur-
I Johnson v. Wells Co. Comers., 107 Ind., 15; Slate v. Boone Co., 59
Mo., 317; Boone v. Denver, 7 Col., 305 (citing State v. Boone Co.).
I Const. of New York, art. VIII, i; Const. of Illinois, 1848, Art.
X, I.
3 Mosier v. Hilton, 15 Birb., 657; U. S. Trust Co. v. Brady, 20 id.,
ii; People v. Brown, 30 id., 24 (affirmed 21 N. Y., 517; N. Y. & H.
R: Co. v. Forty-second St, &c., R. Co., 50 id., 3o9; S. C., 42 How. Pr.,
481.
1 Johnson v. J. & C. R. Co., 23 Ill., 202, To the same effect, Owners
of Lands v. People, 113 id., 296; Wilson v. Trustees, 133 id., 443.
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nished ground for the construction thus placed upon it, it
must be observed that the New Jersey constitution contains
very similar languagei and that the reasons (already
quoted) given by the New Jersey Supreme Courtl when
reaching the opposite conclusion, cannot be lightly dis-
regarded. Whatever may be thought of the New York
and Illinois cases, they are no authority for according to
the legislature the exercise of a judicial function not
expressly granted by the constitution.
In cases where there can be no doubt as to the abso-
lute prohibition of special and local legislation a question
may yet arise as to the existence of legislative discretion in
determining what constitutes a general law under the cir-
cumstances. This question has chiefly arisen in connection
with classification, and in California, where the legislature
is expressly atthorized to classify cities and towns accord-
ing to population,2 it is held that "the manner of their
classification is a subject for legislative control, and the
courts may not interfere with the discretion vested in a
co-ordinate branch of the government."'3 In Pennsylvania,
on the other hand, where a stricter view of such classifica-
tion is taken, the rule is at present established that in'this
and every other matter within the restrictive provisions
the requirements of the constitution must be' closely
followed, and that the question of whether they have,
been so followed or not is for the courts to decide.
Thus in Ayars' Appeal,4 where it was held that there
could be but three classes of cities for the purposes of
municipal legislation, Pell v. Newark 5 was cited with
approval, and its doctrine applied. The Supreme Court
said: "It has been suggested that the question of necessity
for classification and the extent thereof, as Well as of what
are local or special laws, is a legislative and not a judicial
question. The answer to that question is -obvious. The
I Pell v. Newark, 40 N. J. L., 71.
2 Const. Cal., Art. XI, 6.
Peop. v. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436.
iz Pa., 266.
'4-, N. J. L., 7r.
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people, in their wisdom, have seen fit not only to prescribe
the form of enacting laws, but also as to certain subjects,
-the method of legislation, by ordaining that no local or
special law relating to those' subjects shall be passed.
Whether, in any given case, the'legislature has transcended
its power and passed a law in conflict with that limitation
is essentially a question of law and must necessarily be
decided by the courfs. To warrant the conclusion that the
people, in ordaining such limitatious, intended to invest
their law-makers with- judicial power and thus make them
final arbiters of the validity of their own acts, would
require the clearest and most emphatic language to that
effect. No such intention is expressed in the cbnstitution
and none can be inferred from any of its provisions. That
those limitations were designed to establish a fixed and
permanent rule cannot be doubted; but, if the ultimate
application of that rule were to rest solely in the judgment
of that body on which it was intended to operate, nothing
would be more flexible ..... .No such proposition can
be entertained by the courts without abandoning one of the
most important branches of jurisdiction committed to them
by the fundamental law, viz.: the power to ultimately
determine whether or not a given law is local or special
and has been passed in disregard to the constitutional limi-
tation that has been placed upon the power of the legisla-
ture.''
This decision has been approved in Ohio, where the
Court said: "It is.now settled beyond controversy that the
constitutional provision above referred to is mandatory, and
that a failure on the part of the legislature to observe it
will be fatal to the validity of -a statute." 1
The Pennsylvania doctrine has been again very
recently enforced in .In re Ruan Street,2 where the court
held unconstitutional so much of an act as provided a
special system of procedure for the assessment of damages
and benefits on the opening of streets in cities of the first
I Costello v. Wyoming (0.), 30 N. H. Rep., 613.
2 132 Pa., 257, 279.
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class. WILLIAMS, J., speaking for the majority, said: "It
is also suggested that the constitutionality of the Act of
1887 is a legislative and not a judicial question, and that it
should be left only to the judgment of the legislature.
This suggestion is destitute of foundation. The legislature
must exercise its power within the lines laid down by the
constitution. What it shall do within these lines is a ques-
tion that addresses itself to the wisdom and discretion of its
members. Whether it shall disregard them and do that
which the constitution forbids is a question which, when
such legislation is attempted, belongs to the courts. When
they decline, if they ever do, to compel obedience to the
constitutibn, all checks upon legislative power will be gone,
and the doors to all sorts of local and special laws, which
the constitution proposed to close, will be open as wide as
in the worst days of omnibus legislation. What the law
shall be upon* a subject over which the legislature has
power is a legislati e question..... .. Whether the pro-
ceedings in road cases shall be wholly changed or not is for
the legislature to determine. It may give us an entirely
new system of procedure in such cases, if it so desires. But
when it attempts to change the practice in one city or class
cities alone, it is attempting local legislation of a mischiev-
ous kind, which the constitution forbids, and the question
whether such a law shall be enforced is as purely a judicial
question as is.easy to conceive."
While this decision was not unanimous, it is in har-"
mony with the other Pennsylvania cases' in seeking to
enforce the utmost uniformity of legislation that may be
possible.
Questions involving the limits of a legislature's discre-
tion have also sometimes arisen as to the amendment of
See Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa., 258; Scowden's App., 96 id.,
422; Davis v. Clark, io6 id., 377; McCarthy v. Commonwealth, io id.,
243; Morrison v. Bachert, 112 id., 322; Scranton Sch. Dipt. App., 113 id.,
176; Scranton v. Silkman, id., 191; Strine v. Foltz, id., 349; Phila. v.
Haddington Ch., i15 id., 291; Weinman z. Pass. Ry. Co., 1x8 id., 192;
Ayars' App., 122 id., 266.
66
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special and local -laws. It would seem to follow logically
from the restrictions upon such legislation, that no special
or local law, enacted prior to the adoption of these restric-
tions, in regard to any matter as to which, since that time,
geneial legislation is required, should be amended except
by a general law. A special amendatory law is a special
law in regard to the subject regulated by the law which it
is sought to amend, just as much as if it did not in terms
seek to amend any existing law. Every law does in effect
amend existing law, even though it may not do so directly
enough, as to any particular subject, to be technically an
amendment.
As to certain matters some constitutions expressly for-
bid special and local legislation by way of amendment, but
* where the matter is not controlled by some such provision,
the courts of the different States are not wholly in accord
as to this point. The question has arisen most frequently
in regard to the amendment of special charters, particularly
those of municipalities. In California the prohibition of
incorporation by spdcial act is held to prohibit the confer-
ring of any benefit or imposing of any duty -not conferred
or imposed by a general law.' In Iowa,2 Kansas,. and Ohio4
it has been held that the prohibition of incorporation (in.
Ohio, the conferring of corporate powers) by special act
covers the case of amendmenis as well as original charters,
and that old special charters must remain as they are until
altered by some special law. Thus in an Ohio case the
Court pertinently asked: "What reason or object could there
have been in retaining the power in the legislature to
amend previous acts of incorporation, and withholding it
as to all subsequent acts? What reason, in the nature of
1 Peop. v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal., 393.
2 Exparle Pritz, 9 Io., 3o; followed in McGregor v. Baylies, 19 Io.,
43; the practical value of this doctrine is somewhat impaired by Von
Phul v. Hammer, 29 10., 222, which upheld a general law under which
any city or town acting under a -special charter could amend its charter
itself, and adopt such new powers as it saw fit.
Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan., 124.
4State v. Cincinnati, 20 0. St., 18.
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things, in there for giving cities or towns previously incor-
porated the privilege to apply to the legislature for an
amendment, and recognizing the power of the legislature
to act in such cases, and yet depriving those incorporated
subsequently of the same privilege ? It certainly seems to
have been the clear intention, and to be in perfect accord-
ance with the spirit and policy of the instrument, to place
all corporations upon the same ground and to give the legis-
lature the same rule in making laws for their action and
government."'
So it has been held in New Jersey that any change in
a special municipal charter is a regulation of the internal
affairs of the municipality, and therefore cannot be made
by a special act,2 and in Tennessee the same doctrine has
been recognized in regard to private corporations.
3
In applying this doctrine it has been held that an act
subjecting certain classes of property to taxation for street
:miprovements in a particular city,' or for the establishment
of a court in a particular town were amendments of their
respective charters.' It has been held also that a.corpora-
tion with a special charter cannot, while retaining this,
acquire any of the rights or powers granted by the general
law, because it would then possess powers such as corpora-
tions formed under the general law could not obtain.6 In
Illinois, where amendments by special act are forbidden,
the effect of the whole provision is declared to be that
while old special charters are not repealed, they can only
be amended by the particular municipality bringing itself
within the operation of the general law.' An act produc-
ing dissimilarity in the mode of levying and collecting
taxes in the different cities has been held to be an amend-
I Exparle Pritz, 9 Io., 30.
2 Tiger v. Morris Com. Pleas, 42 N. J. L., 631.
3 State v. Wilson, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 246.
4 Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan., 124, 148.
McGregor v. Baylies, 19 1o., 43.
6 State v. Lawrence Bridge Co., 22 Kan., 438. See also San Francisco
v. Spring Valley Water Works Co., 48 Cal., 493-
(; uild v'. Chicago, 8o Ill., 472; Peop. v. Cooper, 83 111., 585.
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ment of their charters, and therefore void.' In New York,
however, where the provision is the same as in Illinois, and
these constitutional restrictions have always been construed
so as to hamper the power of the legislature as little as
possible, this'doctrine is recognized only to a modified
degree, and it is held that a special act to amend the char-
ter of a private corporation is allowable if it seeks to regu-
late the powers, rights, privileges and franchises already
possessed by the corporation,' but not if it undertakes to
grant new powers or franchises.' On the same principle a
special act amending a local law in regard to-petit jurors
has been upheld, the Court stating that "it would be too
strict a construction of the constitutional provision, to hold
that no existing local -law upon one of the subjects men-
tioned in Article 3, § 18 of the constitution, can be amended
in any detail without violating the constitution."4
In Missouri, where amendments by special act are
likewise forbidden, this provision is held to be prospective
merely, especially as another clause of the constitution pro-
vides that all laws then in force, not inconsistent with the
constitution shall temain until they have expired or are
amended or repealed, this being held to contemplate the
amendment of special acts by others of the same character.5
In Colorado, where the legislature is required to pro-
vide by general laws for the organization and classification
of cities and towns, this was not only held not to prevent
special charters previously obtained from being amended
by special act, in cases where no general law was consid-
ered applicable, but it was even intimated that a special
charter could probably be amended in no other way .
6
In Minnesota, too, a special amendment was upheld
Peop. v. Cooper, sufira.
2 Matter of N. Y. Rlev. R. R. CO., 70 N. Y., 327.
'Astor v. Arcade R. R. Co., 1i3 N. Y., 93.
* Peop. v. Petrea, 92 N. Y., 14o.
5 State v. R. R. Co., 48 Mo., 468; St. J. & I. R. R. Co. v. Shambaugh,
io6 id., 557-
6 Brown v. Denver, 7 Col., 305; Peop. v. Londoner, 13 Col., 303;
Huer v. City of Central, 14 Col., 71.
I
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by a divided court on the ground that the prohibition of
the conferring of corporate powers by special act had never
been understood as including amendments of old charters,
the constitution not at time forbidding grants of any special
or exclusive immunity, privilege or franchise to any asso-
ciation or corporation.'
The Indiana constitution of 1851 forbids incorporation
by special act (except in the case of a bank with branches),
but the schedule provides that "all acts of incorporation
for municipal purposes shall continue in force, under this
constitution, until such time as the general assembly shall,
in its discretioii, modify or repeal the same." ' This may,
of course, be done by a general act,3 but the provision* has
been construed not only to authorize a modification or
repeal by general act, but also to permit any amendment
by special act, even where the effect of such amendment is
to enlarge, the jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise, of the
corporate authorities of a municipality.4 The amendment
of a special charter is also regarded as a case where a gen-
eral law is not applicable."
In Wisconsin it has been held that thle prohibition of
special grants of corporate power, except to cities, does not
impair the power to alter or repeal charters previously re-
served to the legislature by the .constitution, and hence
that a special charter can still be amended by a special
act;6 although defective proceedings under special acts can-
not be legalized by this means.
7
I Green v. Knife Falls Boom Co., 35 Minn., 155.
2Schedule, 4-
'Evansville v. Bayard, 39 Ind., 450; Eichels v. Evansville St. Ry.
Co., 78 Ind., 261.
4 Longworth v. Evansville, 32 Ind., 322; Warren v. Evanlsville, xo6
Ind., 104; Evansville v. Summers, io8 id., x89; Wiley v. Bluffton, iii
id., 152.
5See cases cited in last note.
6 Atty. Gen. v. R. R. Co.s, 35 Wis., 425, 56o; Steven's Pt. Boom Co.
v. Reilly, 44 id., 295. "
Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis., 407.
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